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1 – Introduction  
Policy makers and academics often argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) can 
be a source of valuable productivity externalities for developing countries.
1 Prominent 
among the mechanisms often highlighted for these externalities are knowledge spillovers 
and “linkages” from multinationals (MNCs) to domestic firms in host countries. In 
pursuit of such benefits, over the last two decades governments in both developed and 
developing countries have not only reduced barriers to FDI but have also offered special 
incentives to attract foreign firms and foster relationships between MNCs and local firms 
(specially suppliers).
 Surprisingly, however, the empirical literature has not been able to 
confirm the existence of positive externalities from FDI to host countries.
2 Thus, there 
appears to be a significant gap between the consensus among practitioners and the 
empirical literature regarding the importance of positive FDI externalities. 
As mentioned, many countries offer special incentives to FDI.
3 Policies to 
promote FDI take a variety of forms.  In general, incentives fall into two categories: fiscal 
incentives, such as tax holidays and lower taxes for foreign investors; and financial 
incentives, such as government grants, credits at subsidized rates, government equity 
participation and government insurance at preferential rates. Other incentives can include 
subsidized dedicated infrastructure, subsidized services, contract preferences or foreign 
exchange privileges and even monopoly rights. In 1998, 103 countries offered tax 
concessions to foreign companies that set up production or administrative facilities within 
their border (Hanson, 2001). 
In popular discussions it is sometimes argued that this kind of policy is justified as 
a way to generate employment, but – of course – in economies under full employment 
                                                 
1 The scholarly literature on foreign direct investment is vast and has been surveyed many times. For recent 
surveys see Markusen (1995), Caves (1996), Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), Hanson (2001) and Lipsey 
(2002). 
2 In a recent survey of empirical work, Hanson (2001) argues that there is weak evidence that FDI generates 
positive externalities for host countries. In a review of micro data on externalities from foreign owned to 
domestically owned firms, Gorg and Greenwood (2002) conclude that the effects are mostly negative. 
Lipsey (2002) takes a more favorable view from reviewing the micro literature while concluding that in 
general the macro empirical research indicates that the size of inward FDI stocks or flows relative to GDP 
is not related in a consistent way with growth.  
3 On the debate behind incentives to FDI, see Wells and Wint (2000), Hanson (2001) and Blomstrom and 
Kokko (2003). 
  1this is not a valid argument.  Even if there is unemployment, it is not clear that more 
investment will solve the problem; this would depend on the causes and nature of 
unemployment. A more sophisticated argument is that FDI incentives are valid as a way 
to increase the capital stock and thereby allow wages to increase. For this to be cost 
efficient, however, the rate of return to capital in the host country would have to be 
higher than in source countries. But if this were the case, then the subsidy would not be 
necessary. A related and valid reasoning is that FDI incentives are justified as part of an 
optimal tax policy, if it is believed that the investment elasticity to taxes is higher for FDI 
than for national investment. The problem, of course, is that this is ultimately self-
defeating, because countries would compete away the rents and pass them on to 
multinationals. 
In this paper we focus on productivity externalities arising from multinationals to 
domestic firms in the host country as a possibly valid reason for subsidizing FDI. Several 
recent papers have used plant-level data and panel econometric techniques to carefully 
explore the existence of this type of externalities. One conclusion that emerges from this 
literature is that it is difficult to find evidence of positive externalities from multinationals 
to local firms in the same sector (horizontal externalities). In fact, many studies find 
evidence of negative horizontal externalities arising from multinational activity while 
confirming the existence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in 
upstream industries (vertical externalities). In this paper we explore the channels through 
which these positive and negative externalities may materialize, and focus on the role of 
backward linkages, which have not received enough rigorous theoretical and empirical 
attention.  
Under certain conditions (benefits of specialization, increasing returns and 
transportation costs) an increase in demand for specialized inputs would lead to the local 
production of new types of these inputs and this would bring positive externalities to 
other domestic firms that use those inputs. This mechanism, however, has been called 
into question because of the general finding that the share of inputs bought domestically 
by MNCs is lower than for local firms. Many papers have interpreted this finding as 
implying that MNCs generate fewer linkages than domestic firms. We will argue that the 
share of inputs bought domestically is not a valid indicator of the linkage that MNCs can 
  2generate. Instead, based on the model of linkages developed by Rodríguez-Clare (1996), 
we propose an alternative indicator for the linkages that a firm can generate and then 
proceed to calculate it for several countries in Latin America.  
The alternative indicator of linkages we propose is the ratio of the value of inputs 
bought domestically to the total workers hired by the firm. Based on this definition, we 
explore the validity of the claims that have been made in the literature regarding linkages 
across different types of firms. Using plant-level data from Brazil (1997 to 2000), 
Venezuela (1995 to 2000), Mexico (1993 to 2000) and Chile (1987 to 1999), we test for 
differences in the linkage coefficient between foreign and domestic firms. In all countries 
analyzed, and consistent with previous findings in the literature, the share of domestic 
inputs sourced domestically is lower for foreign firms. In contrast, using our proposed 
indicator, we find that foreign firms have higher linkage coefficient in Brazil, Chile and 
Venezuela. For Mexico, we cannot reject the hypothesis that foreign and domestic firms 
have the same linkage potential. 
Thus, our results suggest that some of the general notions in the literature may be 
due to using linkage measures that are not properly derived from theory. It is likely that 
although multinationals do source a lower percentage of their inputs domestically, they 
also use more inputs in relation to the workers they hire. As a result, they do not 
necessarily generate weaker linkages than domestic firms.  For linkages to be meaningful, 
however, it must be that inputs are non-tradable (or, more generally, have high costs 
associated with importing them, relative to domestic procurement) and produced with 
increasing returns to scale.
4 The approach we follow here can be interpreted as 
establishing upper bounds on the linkages that can be generated by different firms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical 
literature on FDI spillovers. Section 3 presents a preliminary discussion on backward 
linkages. Section 4 develops the model. Section 5 describes the data for Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela and presents the main results. Section 6 discusses the main 
findings in relation to the literature. The last section concludes. 
                                                 
4 This point was made originally by Hirschman (1958), and also formalized among others by Rodríguez-
Clare (1996). 
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2 – A view of the recent empirical literature 
What is the empirical evidence regarding spillovers and linkages?
5 One robust 
finding is that MNCs tend to have higher productivity than domestic firms in the same 
sector (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994; Kokko, Zejan and 
Tainsini, 2001). Under these circumstances, FDI would lead to a higher GDP. If MNCs 
paid market wages, the increased GDP would be completely captured by MNCs, and 
hence national welfare would not increase. There is ample evidence, however, that MNCs 
do pay above market wages (Blomstom, 1983; Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken, 
Harrison and Lipsey, 1997; Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin, 1999; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 
2001, 2002) so that it is very likely that some of their higher productivity is shared with 
nationals. This could justify some kind of incentives for MNCs.  
Of potentially much more importance is the possibility that MNCs have a positive 
impact on the productivity levels of local firms. Most studies look for the presence of 
such productivity externalities without trying to understand the mechanism through 
which they occur. In other words, empirical studies have focused on finding indirect 
evidence of externalities by exploring whether increases in the presence of MNCs in a 
country or sector are associated with increases in local firms’ productivity in that country 
or sector or in upstream sectors.  
The empirical evidence on whether FDI generates positive externalities for host 
countries is ambiguous, although the evidence for developing countries is more 
consistently pessimistic (see Table 1 for an overview of the evolution of this literature). 
Using careful econometric techniques, the literature not only has failed to detect the 
presence of  positive productivity externalities for developing countries, but actually has 
found evidence of negative externalities (see Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999).
6  
                                                 
5 See Gorg and Greenaway (2002) and Lipsey (2002) for recent overviews of the literature. 
6 The evidence for industrialized countries tends to be more positive. Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) 
find positive benefits from foreign to local firms in a panel data set of firms in the UK; Gorg and Strobl 
(2002) find that foreign presence reduces exit and encourages entry by domestic-owned firms in the high-
tech sector in Ireland.  
  4A first generation of industry level (cross-section) studies generally found a 
positive correlation between foreign presence and sectoral productivity (for example, the 
pioneering work of Caves (1974) finds positive FDI spillovers in Australia; Blomstrom 
(1986) and Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) find positive effects for Mexico; and Sjoholm 
(1999) for Indonesia). At the macroeconomic level, cross-section empirical work by 
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) and Alfaro, Chandra, Kalemli-Ozcan and 
Sayek (2003) finds little support that FDI has an exogenous positive effect on economic 
growth. However, their evidence suggests that local conditions, such as the level of 
education and the development of local financial markets play an important role in 
allowing the positive effects of FDI to materialize. For example, in a widely cited paper 
in the literature, Borensztein et al. (1998), using a dataset of FDI flows from 
industrialized countries to sixty-nine developing countries find that FDI is an important 
vehicle for transferring technology and higher growth only when the host country has a 
minimum threshold of human capital.
7 
As Aitken and Harrison (1999) note, however, cross-section studies of this nature 
are subject to a critical identification problem.
8 At the micro level, foreign firms may be 
located in high productivity industries as opposed to causing productivity externalities. At 
the macro level, high growth countries may attract more FDI as opposed to FDI causing 
this high growth. If this is the case, the coefficients on cross-section estimates are likely 
to overstate the positive impact of foreign investment. As a result, one could find 
evidence of positive externalities from foreign investment where no externalities occur. 
At the macro level, Carkovic and Levine’s (2002) work, for example, casts doubt 
on the findings on growth and FDI. Using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator designed by Arrellano and Bover (1995) to account for simultaneity bias and 
country-specific effects, they find that the exogenous component of FDI does not exert a 
robust positive influence on growth.  At the micro level, the work of Aitken and Harrison 
(1999), using a panel data set of Venezuelan plants, confirms that differences in 
                                                 
7 Likewise, Xu (2000) using data on U.S. MNCs finds that a country needs to reach a minimum human 
capital threshold in order to benefit from the technology transfer from MNCs, and that most developing 
countries do not meet this threshold. 
8 Since cross-sectional studies aggregated at the sector level fail to control for time invariant differences in 
productivity across sectors, which might be correlated but not caused by foreign presence, they fail to 
establish causality and are likely to generate biased coefficients. 
  5productivity levels are in fact correlated with the pattern of foreign investment, biasing 
previous results. Once these productivity differences across industries are properly taken 
into consideration, they still find a positive relationship between increased foreign equity 
participation and plant’s performance, suggesting that individual plants do benefit from 
foreign investment. However, the positive own-plant effect is only robust for small plants 
(defined as plants with less then 50 employees). More importantly, they find that, in 
contrast with what would be expected in the presence of positive externalities, 
productivity in domestically owned plants declines when foreign investment increases. 
Thus, the overall effect of foreign investment in the case of Venezuela is small.  
The paper by Aitken and Harrison spawned a second-generation of empirical 
studies of FDI spillovers in which panel data are used to deal with the endogeneity 
problem that affected previous studies. In the particular case of developing countries, 
these studies find no indication of the existence of positive horizontal externalities. In 
fact, many studies find evidence of negative horizontal externalities. In a recent review of 
the micro evidence on externalities from foreign owned to domestically owned firms 
which pays particular attention to panel studies, Gorg and Greenaway (2002) conclude 
that the effects are mostly negative.
9 
One explanation for the lack of evidence for externalities is that multinationals 
have the incentive to minimize technology leakages to competitors while improving the 
productivity of suppliers by transferring knowledge to them. Thus, if FDI were to 
generate spillovers, they are more likely to be vertical rather than horizontal in nature. 
Most empirical studies of FDI spillovers have regressed local firm productivity on FDI 
activity within the same sector.  Although such studies find no horizontal spillovers, the 
empirical work at the intra-industry level might not be suitable to capture wider spillover 
effects on the host economy such as those created between MNCs and their suppliers. For 
example, using industry level panel data for ten Colombian manufacturing sectors from 
1974-1998, Kugler (2001) finds evidence of inter-industry linkages. However, only in 
                                                 
9 Grog and Greenaway’s (2002) survey of studies using panel data sets finds that only two studies for 
industrialized countries and none for developing countries report positive evidence for within-industry 
externalities; all other studies using panel data find either negative or no statistically significant effects.  
  6one sector does he find evidence of intra-industry spillovers.
10 Kugler, however, does not 
explore the mechanisms that may be behind these inter-sector externalities. 
In recent years a new group of papers (which we label third-generation papers) 
has explored the existence of positive externalities from FDI towards local firms in 
upstream industries (suppliers). Here the findings are more encouraging (see Table 1). 
Furthermore, these papers have addressed a series of methodological problems in the 
previous literature, such as the biases that result from the dependence of firm exit and 
usage of factor inputs on productivity levels. Three recent papers on FDI and vertical 
spillovers control for time-invariant differences in plant productivity through fixed effects 
estimation and for time-variant productivity shocks likely to affect plant productivity 
using the semi-parametric estimation proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).
11 Using panel 
data for Lithuania from 1996 through 2000, Javorcik (2003) examines whether the 
productivity of domestic firms is correlated with the presence of multinationals in 
downstream sectors (potential customers). Her empirical results are consistent with the 
existence of productivity externalities from FDI taking place through contacts between 
foreign affiliates and their local suppliers in upstream sectors but there is no indication of 
externalities occurring within the same industry.
12 
Similarly, using a panel dataset of Indonesian manufacturing establishments from 
1988 through 1996, Blalock and Gertler (2003) find evidence of positive vertical 
externalities. They also find that downstream FDI increases output and firm value added 
while decreasing prices and market concentration. Finally, using plant-level data for 
manufacturing firms in Mexico from 1993 through 2000, López-Córdova (2003) finds 
                                                 
10 Kugler  (2001) uses cointegration techniques to determine whether or not a relationship exists between 
capital accumulation by foreign firms and domestic productivity in a sector.
 If there is such a relationship, 
this is taken as evidence for productivity spillovers.
  
11 Olley and Pakes (1996) propose using investment as a proxy for idiosyncratic shocks, conditional on 
capital. Because capital responds to the shocks only in a lagged fashion through contemporaneous 
investment, the return to the other can be obtained by non-parametrically inverting investment and capital 
to proxy for the unobserved shock. See Pavnic (2001) for an application of this estimation algorithm to 
study the effects of liberalized trade on plant productivity in Chile. 
12 Javorcik (2003) uses Olley and Pakes (1996) to account for endogeneity of input demand and corrects 
standard errors to take into account the fact that the measures of potential spillover are industry specific 
while the observations in the data set are at the firm level – which could lead to serious downward bias in 
the estimated errors.  In her panel evidence without Olley-Pakes correction, she finds evidence consistent 
with the existence of positive spillovers from FDI taking place through backward linkages but no indication 
of spillovers occurring through horizontal channels. When applying the Olley-Pakes correction, however, 
the coefficients on the backward variable are positive but not significant at the conventional levels. 
  7that foreign capital improves total factor productivity (TFP), with positive inter-industry 
externalities prevailing over a negative intra-industry effect.  
Overall, however, the existing evidence needs to be taken with caution. 
Methodological issues remain regarding estimation techniques and measurement of 
variables, in particular productivity measures. As Tybout (2001) and Katayama, Lu and 
Tybout (2003) note, inputs and outputs are typically poorly measured and – most 
importantly – physical outputs are not really observed; what is usually measured are 
nominal variables deflated by a broad price index.
13 This can lead to bias in the 
productivity measures. If, for example, firms that expand rapidly also tend to drive their 
output prices down relatively rapidly, as one would expect in differentiated product 
markets, then output growth is underestimated when input growth is rapid. In this case, 
markups, productivity measures and other derived calculations would be biased. 
Summarizing, one conclusion that emerges from the empirical literature is that it 
is difficult to find robust evidence of positive externalities from multinationals to local 
firms in the same sector (horizontal externalities). In fact, many studies for developing 
countries that have paid particular attention to causality problems have actually found 
evidence of negative horizontal externalities arising from multinational activity while 
confirming the existence of positive externalities from multinationals to local firms in 
upstream industries (vertical externalities). Although, as explained above, methodological 
issues remain unsolved in the literature, our goal, with these caveats in mind, is to try to 
understand these findings and explore whether linkages can explain some of them. 
 
3 – Preliminary discussion: multinationals, knowledge spillovers, and backward 
linkages  
The empirical literature reviewed in the previous section does not address the 
mechanisms behind the horizontal and vertical FDI externalities. This may be appropriate 
as a first stage, but we believe it is now important to look into this matter both because it 
                                                 
13See Tybout (2001) for an overview of the evidence and methodological issues regarding firm-level 
studies of TFP and Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003) for an alternative approach. 
  8could help us determine the robustness of the findings and because it is important if we 
want to device appropriate policy interventions to maximize FDI externalities.  
There are different mechanisms through which FDI could generate positive 
production externalities. One such mechanism depends on the flow of workers out of 
MNCs.
14 For example, it may be that MNCs devote more resources to labor training than 
domestic firms. Given that a large part of this labor training is not paid for by workers 
and constitutes knowledge that is not completely firm specific, this constitutes a positive 
externality which leads to higher wages for these workers and/or higher productivity for 
firms that hire these workers after they leave the MNCs. In general, these labor training 
externalities would show up as “horizontal” knowledge spillovers, in the sense that they 
would benefit other firms in the same sector as the MNCs. Something very similar 
happens if workers increased their knowledge not through formal labor training but 
through on the job training, learning by doing or learning by observing. The spillover can 
also take place through “spin-offs.” These are the cases where workers leave the MNC to 
set up their own firms and benefit from the knowledge they gained while at the MNC.  
As Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) note, there is evidence that MNEs undertake 
substantial efforts in the education of local workers (Lindsey, 1986; Ritchie, Zhuang and 
Whitworth, 2001) and that MNEs offer more training to technical workers and managers 
than do local firms (Chen, 1983; Gershenberg, 1987).
15 Studying the case of Taiwan, 
Pack (1997) finds evidence that trained managers often leave MNCs to create their own 
firms and that labor mobility from MNCs to domestic firms is important. In some cases, 
MNCs also enter into training cooperation with local institutions in the host economy. 
For example, Intel in Costa Rica and Shell-BP in Nigeria have made contributions to 
local universities; in Singapore, the Economic Development Board has collaborated with 
MNCs to establish and improve training centers, (World Bank, 1995; Spar, 1998; Larraín, 
López, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2000).   
                                                 
14 Fallick, Fleischman and Rebitzer (2003) investigate the role of knowledge spillovers due to easy mobility 
of skilled employees among firms in Silicon Valley.  
15 Fosfuri, Motta and Ronde (2001) formalize this view. In their model, a multinational firm can use a 
superior technology only after training a local worker. Technological spillovers from FDI arise when a 
domestic firms hires such worker. Pecuniary spillovers arise when the foreign affiliate pays higher wages to 
prevent the worker form leaving.    
  9Knowledge spillovers can also take place without formal flows of workers out of 
the MNCs. One would expect that knowledge about production process would diffuse 
from one firm to others simply because of the regular human interaction among people 
performing similar jobs for different companies. For example, a simple innovation 
introduced by one MNC in the maquila sector in Honduras was to provide a free 
breakfast to employees half an hour before the start of the morning shift. This not only 
provided incentives for workers to show up on time but also helped to improve their 
productivity. This simple idea rapidly diffused to other firms and soon became the norm 
in the maquila sector. More sophisticated or tacit knowledge can also diffuse in cases 
where there is close interaction between MNCs and local firms, as for instance in the 
case of MNCs and their suppliers. Branstetter (2000), for example, using firm level data 
on Japanese firms’ FDI and innovation activity, finds evidence that FDI increases the 
flow of knowledge spillovers (measured by patent citations) both from and to Japanese 
multinationals undertaking direct investment in the U.S. 
An entirely different mechanism for FDI externalities occurs through backward 
and forward linkages. It is important to distinguish linkages from spillovers, as they 
have often been confused in the literature. Following Hirschman (1958), we view 
linkages as pecuniary externalities. In contrast to knowledge spillovers, pecuniary 
externalities take place through market transactions. Consider, for example, the case of 
a firm that invents a new good. Under realistic assumptions, such a firm will not be able 
to capture the full consumer surplus generated by the introduction of the good. Thus, 
there will be a positive pecuniary externality from the firm to consumers when the good 
is introduced. The same phenomenon arises when, instead of inventing a new good, the 
firm is simply starting up its production in a developing country. Of course, under 
constant returns to scale, all goods generating positive consumer surplus would be 
produced and there would be no inefficiency. But consider the more realistic scenario in 
which there are fixed or start-up costs. In this case, new goods will be introduced until 
the marginal good just earns enough profits to generate the market return on the firm’s 
fixed investment. The problem, however, is that this does not take into account the 
consumer surplus generated by each new good. Hence, there will be a market 
  10inefficiency associated with the pecuniary externality, resulting in suboptimal 
equilibrium variety. 
Readers will notice that this discussion has implicitly assumed some kind of 
non-tradability. If goods were perfectly tradable (i.e., there were no transportation costs) 
then it wouldn’t make sense to talk about a firm introducing a good to a developing 
country: all existing goods would be automatically available everywhere as long as 
there was a demand. But, of course, there is ample evidence that transportation costs are 
important, and – more generally – there is evidence of the existence of important 
benefits to having inputs produced locally. 
Backward and forward linkages are associated with pecuniary externalities in the 
production of inputs. Inputs that would generate a positive social value are not 
introduced because suppliers do not take into account the full producer surplus, which 
in this case is the increased productivity derived by firms that could use those inputs 
instead of others that are less specialized and hence less appropriate to the specific 
needs of the firm. Under these circumstances (inputs produced with increasing returns, 
transportation costs, and benefits of specialization), backward linkages are said to arise 
when a firm increases the demand for inputs and this leads to the introduction of new 
input varieties. Thanks to the benefits of specialization, the introduction of these inputs 
generates an increase in productivity for downstream producers. Thus, backward 
linkages entail a positive horizontal productivity externality.  
Forward linkages take place when the introduction of new inputs lowers the 
production cost of certain goods, making their production profitable for downstream 
producers. In Rodríguez-Clare (1996), for example, MNCs may create backward 
linkages and thereby lead to the production of a larger variety of intermediate goods; in 
turn, this allows the economy to gain a comparative advantage in the production of 
more sophisticated final goods. In the end, the economy ends up with higher 
productivity and higher wages thanks to the backward and forward linkages generated 
by MNCs. 
According to this view of linkages, MNCs could even generate a negative 
backward-linkage effect, as shown in Rodríguez-Clare (1996). This could occur, for 
  11example, if MNCs behave as enclaves, by importing all their inputs and restricting their 
local activities to hiring labor. In this case, demand for inputs decreases as MNCs 
increase in importance relative to domestic firms and this leads to a reduction in input 
variety and specialization. This would show up as a negative horizontal externality.
16 
 
4 – A simple model of backward linkages  
In this section we present a simple model adapted from Rodríguez-Clare (1996) to 
formalize the idea of backward linkages in an economy with several sectors. We then 
propose a way to measure a firm’s linkage generating potential, discuss the conditions 
under which it would be valid, and discuss alternative measures. 
 
4.1 – The model 
Consider an economy (the host country) producing J manufacturing goods and an 
agricultural good. The agricultural good is produced one for one with labor, L, and is 
perfectly traded, with an international price equal to one. Thus, this good acts as the 
numeraire, and sets the wage equal to one. Imagine for simplicity that this is a small 
economy that takes final good prices as given, and let  j p  represent the price of 
manufacturing good j. Both domestic firms and multinationals produce manufacturing 
good j. Domestic firms produce good j with labor that is specific to sector j (and available 
in total quantity  j L  in the economy) and a composite intermediate good, X, according to 
the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
(1)   
() 1 () ()
jj
jj j QA j L X
ββ − =
where  0( ) j 1 β <<
                                                
. In turn, X is assembled from a continuum of non-tradable 
differentiated intermediate goods according to the following Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier 
specification: 
 
16 Note that in this argumentation it is key that MNCs displace national firms from the market: this can be 
due to labor market constraints (in the case of exports) or it could be that MNCs compete with domestic 
firms in the local market, as in Markusen and Venables (1999). 
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17 We assume that there is a fixed requirement of one unit of L to 
produce a variety of intermediate goods and that production of each additional unit of 
such goods requires one additional unit of L. 
  Multinationals produce good j with a production function that is the same as the 
one for domestic firms except for the parameter  ( ) j β , which we denote by  ( ) j β   in the 
case of multinationals. In general, we will think of  ( ) ( ) j j ββ <  , to capture the idea that 
multinationals have a more “complex” or “roundabout” production process, which 
depends more on intermediate goods and less on labor.
18 An additional difference 
between multinationals and domestic firms is that the former have access to intermediate 
goods from the country where they have their headquarters. Thus, whereas domestic 
firms source all their intermediate goods domestically, multinationals buy only part of 
them domestically and import the rest from their home country. 
As is standard in the literature, we assume that there is monopolistic competition 
in the market for intermediate goods, with a different firm selling each variety. The 
equilibrium variety n is determined by the zero-profit condition for monopolists selling 
intermediate-good varieties. Each firm will charge a price equal to 1/α  (recall that the 
wage is equal to one) and make profits equal to  / x 1 θ − , where  /(1 ) θ αα ≡ − .
19 Thus, the 
zero profit condition implies  ( ) xj θ = . 
Since labor cannot move across manufacturing sectors, then we must allow the 
wage in sector j,  , to differ from the wage in other manufacturing sectors. Wages will 
be determined by the zero profit condition for final good producers in each 
j w
                                                 
17 Alternatively, we could assume that there are some inputs that are tradable and others that are non-
tradable, as long as there are no differences across domestic and multinational firms as to which of these 
inputs they use. We believe that the same results would arise if instead of the extreme assumption of non-
tradability we assumed that inputs had significant transportation costs, something for which there is ample 
evidence (see the discussion in section 4.1).  
18 This would also arise if multinationals use technologies that are more capital intensive relative to 
domestic firms and if capital is complementary with intermediate goods. We could easily introduce capital 
into the model without changing any of the substantive results as long as multinationals do not compete 
with domestic firms for capital. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption, as the main area of 
competition between multinationals and domestic firms is for labor (perhaps only skilled labor, see below). 
19 Given that the firm sells x units at price 1/α  and unitary cost, then variable profits are (1/ 1) / x x α θ −= . 
Total profits are variable profits minus the fixed cost, which is simply one. 
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of x that final good producers purchase per unit of labor hired is given by  () / j vjw n α , 
w h e r e  () ( 1 () ) / () vj j j β β ≡− . To proceed, imagine first that there were no 





() () j v j n
∑ . 
Without loss of generality, we choose the values for   in such a way that the 
minimum unit cost of manufacturing good j is  .
( ) Aj









20 In turn, this 
implies that the equilibrium wages are given by 
β θ α = . Thus, the 
equilibrium condition that determines n is: 
/ n θ =
1/ ( ) () ()
j j nv
β γσ α
  () () ) / j β  ( 1 ≡− () j β  ( ) j γ
(3)  () () jj j vjwnL α ∑  
We make the assumption that vj ( ) θ <  for all j, which implies that the share of 
intermediate goods relative to labor in the production of final good j is lower than the 
(absolute value of) the elasticity of substitution across varieties of intermediate goods. 
This condition is sufficient to guarantee that the LHS of (3) is decreasing in n and hence 
that there is a unique equilibrium value of n.
21 
Our interest now is in understanding the effect of multinationals on the 
equilibrium n. Imagine that multinationals hire   units of labor in manufacturing sector 
j. As in the case of domestic firms, it is useful to derive the multinationals’ demand for 
each variety of intermediate goods in the host country per unit of labor hired there. This 
is given by 
mj L
() () / jj j w n n ,  w h e r e  vj . The term  , 
which will generally be strictly lower than one, is the share of inputs sourced 
domestically by multinationals. As shown in Rodríguez-Clare (1996),  ( ) j γ  is higher 
when the variety of intermediate goods available in the home country is lower and when 
the transportation cost of intermediate goods is higher, perhaps because the home country 
is far away from the host country. The term  ( ) j n σ  is the ratio of the price of good j and 
                                                 
1 20 Specifically, we assume that 
1( ) () () ()
j Aj j vj
β β
− − = . 
21 If, on the other hand, the share of intermediate goods in manufacturing is high and/or the elasticity of 
substitution across intermediate goods is low (implying a high degree of love of variety), the wage will be 
increasing very rapidly in n. This could make the LHS of (3) increasing in n, in which case there would not 
be an equilibrium with unitary wage, as we have been assuming. 
  14the minimum unit cost for multinationals. Since multinationals have access to 
intermediate goods from abroad and since  ( ) ( ) j j ββ ≠  , their minimum unit cost will be 
lower than for domestic firms, and hence this ratio will be higher than one. This term is 
increasing in n because as n increases, the wage   increases, and given that  j w
() () j j ββ <  , this increases the unit cost of domestic firms more than for multinationals. 
( γ
() () / j vjwn α () / j n n
(  )>
( ) j n σ >
1/ ( ) n










We can see that there are two sources of differences in the purchases of 
intermediate goods per unit of labor hired between multinationals and domestic firms. 
The first relates to the share parameter, defined by the share of inputs bought 
domestically. This is equal to one for domestic firms and  ) 1 j <  for multinationals. The 
second is the intensity parameter, defined as the quantity of each variety of the 
intermediate good bought domestically per unit of labor hired. This is captured by 
n  and   for domestic firms and multinationals, 
respectively. With 
1/ ( ) () ()
j
j nv j w
β σα
 
( ) ( ) j j ββ <   then we have that vj . Together with the fact 
that 
( ) vj
1, this results in a higher intensity parameter for multinationals than for 
domestic firms. 
We assume that entry by multinationals is exogenous. Thus, we simply take a 




) (( ) / )( ) ( ( )
j
jj j j wn nvjL vj L α − += ∑    j m θ
It is important, again, to ensure that the LHS of (4) is decreasing in n, so that the 
equilibrium level n determined implicitly by this equation is unique. As we show in 







 for all j. As we had 
before for domestic firms, this implies that the share of intermediate goods in 
multinationals production of manufactures is not too high relative to the elasticity of 
substitution across inputs. 
The impact of changes in   depends on the relationship between vj and  jm L ( )




  j . In particular, it is easy to see that the equilibrium level of n is 
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1/ ( ) () () () ()
j
j j nv j v
β γσ >
  j . We refer to this case as one 
where there is a positive linkage effect of multinationals. On the other hand, if 
1/ ( () () () () j
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j , then multinationals have a negative linkage effect and 
equilibrium n is decreasing in  . The intuition for this result is that if  jm L
j nv  j v
β γσ <

                                                
j , then a stronger presence of multinationals reduces the 
demand for domestic intermediate goods because multinationals’ demand for these 
intermediate goods per unit of labor is lower than for the domestic firms they displace 
from the labor market in. 
The importance of the linkage effect, of course, arises from the fact that there is 
love of variety for inputs. That is, productivity of final good producers increases with an 
increase in the variety of domestic intermediate goods produced (this is why   is 
increasing in n). This can be seen as capturing the benefits of specialization or the 
productivity gains from the division of labor. The positive association between 
intermediate goods variety (n) and productivity of final good producers implies that a 
positive (negative) linkage effect has a positive (negative) effect on productivity among 
domestic firms.
( ) j wn
22 
To conclude this subsection, it is worth stressing two points that emerge from our 
analysis. The first point is that multinationals’ share coefficient measured by most studies 
of linkages does not capture the whole story. The share coefficient most likely will be 
lower for multinationals than for domestic firms, but the linkage coefficient is the product 
of two terms: the share coefficient and the intensity coefficient. Given that, as we have 
shown, the intensity coefficient most likely will be higher for multinationals than for 
domestic firms, conclusions based on comparisons of only the share coefficient are likely 
to be wrong. The second point is that a positive backward linkage effect by 
multinationals leads to a positive effect on TFP for firms in the same industry, rather than 
for firms in upstream industries. In other words, a positive backward linkage effect leads 
 
22 Notice that in the model we have presented, a positive linkage effect of multinationals in manufacturing 
sector j implies an increase in variety that benefits all manufacturing sectors. This is because we have 
assumed that intermediate goods are not sector specific. Alternatively, we could assume that all 
intermediate goods are sector specific, in which case a positive linkage effect in sector j would only benefit 
domestic firms in that same sector. The theoretical and empirical analysis are not affected by this change in 
assumptions, so it is just a matter of interpretation.  
  16to a positive horizontal externality rather than a positive vertical externality, as often has 
been assumed. 
 
4.2 – Measuring the linkage coefficient 
Under the assumptions of the model presented in this section, the appropriate 
measure of the linkage coefficient is the value of inputs bought domestically per unit of 
labor hired. Let us consider the different key assumptions for this result and how the 
violation of these assumptions would affect the validity of our measure for the linkage 
coefficient. 
First, a key assumption is that all the intermediate goods used by domestic firms 
are non-tradable. This is clearly a very extreme assumption and could significantly affect 
the results of the model. For instance, consider a model with two kinds of inputs: non-
tradable and tradable with no transportation costs. Clearly, only demand for non-tradable 
inputs generates meaningful linkages. Imagine that we found that the linkage coefficient 
defined above is higher for multinationals than for domestic firms. This would lead to the 
conclusion that multinationals have a positive linkage effect, but this would be wrong if 
multinationals buy mostly tradable inputs, whereas domestic firms buy mostly non-
tradable inputs. Ideally, we would take into account only the purchases of non-tradable 
inputs, but this is clearly impossible in most cases due to data constraints. In Section 5, 
we explore this topic further. 
Second, another key assumption in our model is that the degree of increasing 
returns is the same for all intermediate goods. But imagine a situation where intermediate 
goods exhibit either increasing returns, as in the model above, or constant returns to 
scale. Clearly, only demand for intermediate goods of the first kind entails linkages. 
Thus, one could imagine a situation where multinationals have a higher linkage 
coefficient and yet, if domestic firms use mostly inputs with increasing returns and 
multinationals use mostly inputs with constant returns, the conclusion of a positive 
linkage effect by multinationals would be incorrect. Given data constraints, again, there is 
little we can do at this stage regarding this issue. 
Third, a further concern with the measurement we propose is related to our 
assumption of a common elasticity of substitution among all intermediate goods. This is 
  17relevant because demand for inputs with a low elasticity of substitution generate linkages 
with a stronger effect on productivity than is the case with inputs that have good 
substitutes. Thus, in the same spirit as the arguments above, it could be that 
multinationals have a higher linkage coefficient than domestic firms and yet their linkage 
effect is negative because they demand mostly inputs with good substitutes, whereas 
domestic firms demand inputs with bad substitutes.  
A final concern we want to mention has to do with the model’s assumptions 
regarding labor. The simplifying assumption we made is that multinationals and domestic 
firms employ the same kind of workers. But consider the more realistic scenario where 
multinationals hire more skilled workers than domestic firms. We could modify the 
model to capture this possibility by assuming that production of manufacturing goods is 
carried out with both skilled labor – which is sector specific – and unskilled labor – 
which is mobile across sectors and in particular equal to labor used in agriculture. In this 
case, it can easily be shown that the relevant linkage coefficient is the ratio of inputs 
bought domestically to the number of skilled workers employed. Again, one can imagine 
a situation where the linkage coefficient defined above is higher for multinationals than 
for domestic firms but where this modified linkage coefficient (dividing by the number of 
skilled workers rather than the total number of workers) is lower for multinationals than 
domestic firms.
23 Fortunately, data for some of our countries allows us to explore the 
importance of this issue. 
 
4.3 – Evidence in favor of the model 
In the next section we will explore the quantitative implications of the model. This 
empirical exercise is meaningful only to the extent that the model captures the essence of 
the way in which multinationals affect host countries through linkages. What evidence do 
we have to lead us to believe that this is the case? There are two ways to approach this 
question: first, by exploring the reasonableness of the model’s critical assumptions, and 
second, by reviewing the available evidence regarding the model’s implications.  
                                                 
23 Hanson (2001) makes a similar point by noting that positive externalities by multinationals are less likely 
when there is stronger competition for scarce skilled labor between multinationals and domestic firms. 
  18As to the first approach, recall that the three key assumptions of the model are that 
inputs are non-tradable and produced with increasing returns, and that there are benefits 
to specialization. Of course, non-tradability of inputs is only an extreme way to capture 
transportation costs in the model. Evidence of the importance of transportation costs for 
inputs can be found in Overman, Redding and Venables (2001). Four additional 
references may be useful: first, Hummels (1999, 2001) provides evidence of costs of 
international trade (which include tariffs and non-tariff barriers, shipping costs, costs of 
time delays, and other costs associated with marketing and distribution) for a large class 
of goods and inputs. Second, Steinberg (2002) shows that the production of most inputs 
in Singapore – a small and very open economy where one would think that everything is 
tradable – behaves as if inputs are non-tradable. Third, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 
(1997) and Hummels and Klenow (2002) show that variety of imports increases with 
country size, a result consistent with the existence of fixed costs of importing. Finally, a 
particular class of inputs that fit the model well is producer services, as discussed in 
Rodríguez-Clare (1993). Alternatively, one may think of the assumption of non-
tradability of inputs as capturing the benefits for producers to having local as opposed to 
foreign suppliers. This comes out clearly in interviews to multinationals as well as in 
case-study analysis, like those presented in Porter (1990). 
The other two key assumptions of the model (increasing returns and benefits to 
specialization) are now standard in several fields of economics, such as international 
trade (Ethier, 1982; Helpman and Krugman, 1985), growth (Romer, 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1992), development (Rodrik, 1995; Rodríguez-Clare, 1996), and economic 
geography (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). Moreover, there is good evidence on 
the importance of increasing returns in the production of producer services (Rodríguez-
Clare, 1993) as well as plant-level increasing returns in manufacturing (Tybout and 
Westbrook, 1995). Finally, there is recent evidence consistent with the implications of 
our three key assumptions working together, namely agglomeration economies (Ellison 
and Glaeser, 1997, 1999; Hanson, 2000) and sector wide increasing returns in 
international trade (Antweiler and Trefler, 2000). 
Besides checking for evidence in support for the key assumptions in our model, an 
alternative approach involves testing the model directly. Most of what has been done so 
  19far in this regard entails case studies, with almost no rigorous empirical analysis. 
However, this literature, and particularly when analyzing East-Asian countries’ cases, 
does provide evidence in support of the view that multinationals have been involved in 
positive linkage relations with domestic firm (Lall, 1980; Pack 1997; UNCTAD, 2001).  
But, as mentioned, expect for few papers, there has not been a strong connection 
between theoretical and empirical work in this literature.  The only empirical analysis that 
we are aware of is the one by Gorg and Strobl (2000). Following Markusen and Venables 
(1999), Gorg and Strobl (2000) estimate the factors that lead to entry of domestic firms in 
the manufacturing sector in the Irish economy. Their findings suggest there is a positive 
effect of MNC in domestic firm entry. Their work, however, defines the linkage-effect as 
the share of inputs sourced domestically, which as explained in Section 4, might be a 
misleading indicator of the true linkage potential of a firm. 
 
5 – Measuring linkage coefficients for MNCs and local firms in Latin America 
In this section we use our proposed measure of the linkage coefficient to explore 
the model’s implied relationship between linkages generated by foreign and local firms in 
the several countries for which we obtained the appropriate data. Using this definition, 
we then compare our results with the main findings in the literature. It is important here 
to warn the reader again that the empirical exercise in this section does not involve a test 
of the model presented in the previous section. Instead, what we do is to explore its 
quantitative implications. We believe that actual testing of the model remains an 
important issue for future research.  
 
5.1 - Data  
The empirical analysis was performed using manufacturing firm data from Chile, 
Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil distinguished by sector and ownership. In all cases, a firm-
plant was considered foreign if foreigners owned more than 50% of equity.   
For Brazil, the sample covers 1997 through 2000. The analysis is based on a 
dataset of firms taken for the Annual Industrial Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Annual, 
PIA), conducted by IBGE, Brazil’s statistical office. The unbalanced panel has 38926 
  20observations, with 3118 foreign ones. The number of observations ranges from 10767 in 
1997 to 8528 in 2000. For Chile, the sample covers firms in the manufacturing sector for 
the years 1987 through 1999 and was taken from the Annual Industrial Survey (Industrial 
Annual). Our sample includes 65809 observations, with 6223 foreign ones. The number 
of observations ranges from 5466 in 1996 to 4394 in 1999. Data for Mexico were taken 
from the Annual Industrial Survey (EIA, Encuestra Industrial Annual). Our sample 
covers the years 1993 through 2000 and includes 47914 observations, with 4071 foreign 
ones. The number of observations per year ranges from 6616 in 1993 to 5330 in 2000. 
Data for Venezuela are from the annual industrial survey of plants (Encuesta Industrial). 
The data covered the years 1995 through 2000. Our sample includes 13765 observations, 
and 1508 observations were classified as foreign. The number of observations covered 
ranges from 1785 in 1998 to 3572 in 1996.  
  
5.2 – Basic results for the linkage coefficient 
We calculated the linkage coefficient as the value of domestic inputs to total 
workers per year for each firm.  Table 2a presents the main descriptive statistics for the 
linkage coefficient for the countries and years in our sample. As seen in Table 2a, there is 
wide variation in the linkage coefficient across countries and years and different patterns 
emerge. For Mexico, the linkage coefficient for foreign firms is lower than for local 
firms. In contrast, the linkage coefficient for Brazil, Venezuela and Chile is higher for 
foreign firms than for local ones.  
In order to compare our linkage coefficient to those used in the literature, we also 
calculated the share of inputs sourced domestically per year by each firm. Table 2b shows 
comparable statistics for this measure.  In all cases, we observe a higher share of inputs 
sourced domestically by local firms versus foreign ones. For Mexico and Brazil, the share 
of domestic inputs sourced domestically is fairly constant throughout the period while for 
Chile it tends to decline and to increase in the case of Venezuela. 
Finally, Table 2c reports the intensity coefficient, calculated as total inputs bought 
by the firm to total employees per firm (i.e. intensity coefficient = linkage coefficient × 
share). There is also wide variation of this indicator throughout the sample. Overall, 
  21however, the intensity coefficient for foreign firms tends to be higher than for local firms 
for all countries in our sample. 
 
5.3 – Regression analysis 
We use the ratio of inputs bought domestically to workers as our linkage 
coefficient and explore the validity of the claims that have been made in the literature 
regarding linkages across different types of firms such as how the linkage coefficient 
compares between local and foreign firms. We estimate the following relation: 
(5)  01 ijt ijt j t ijt LinkageCoefficient Foreign β βµ µ ε = ++ + +  
where  ijt LinkageCoefficient
ijt Foreign
 refers to domestic inputs to total workers for firm i in sector 
j at time t;  is a dummy variable taking the value of one if firm i in sector j at 
time t is owned by foreigners (50% or more foreign equity);  j µ  and  t µ  are meant to 
capture sector and time specific effects, and  ijt ε is an iid error term.
24 
Table 3 presents the result of estimating equation (5) excluding the sector-
dummies. We find that multinational’s linkage coefficient is significantly higher in 
Brazil, Chile and Venezuela. For Mexico, although our estimations imply a lower linkage 
coefficient for foreign firms, the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. 
These results remain robust once we control for different sectors, as seen in Table 4a.
25 
Once we control for sector differences, we find higher and significant linkage coefficients 
in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.
26 Interestingly, the coefficient for Mexico in the 
regression that controls for time and industry effects is now positive, although not 
significant. The estimated effects are also economically significant. An increase in the 
                                                 
24 We used 9 sectors according to ISIC2 classification for Mexico, Chile and Venezuela. For Brazil, we 
have ISIC3 code-15 sectors.  
25 Results are also robust to excluding outliers; similar results are obtained using log of the linkage 
coefficient..  
26 We further explored for differences in terms of linkage potential for foreign firms at the sector level. We 
estimated the following relation: Linkage Coefficientijt = β0 + β1Foreignitjt + β1Foreignitjt×µj + µj  + µt + 
εijt,  where the term Foreignitjt×µj  is meant to capture differences for foreign firms at the sector level. 
Although, we found foreign firms to have significantly different linkage potential across some sectors these 
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multinational firms) from 10% to 11%, implies an average increase in wages ranging 
from close to 0.2% in Venezuela to up to 0.6% in Chile.
27  
We compare our results to those obtained in the literature by using the percentage 
of inputs sourced locally, which has been used as an indicator of linkage effect in the 
literature.
28 In particular, we estimated an equation similar to (5) but with 
 as the dependent variable, where Share  is the ratio of 
domestic inputs to total inputs for firm i in sector j at time t. Since the dependent variable 
can take values between 0 and 1, we estimated this equation using a Tobit regression.
ijt ShareCoefficient ijt Coefficient
29  
As seen in Table 4b, we find the share of inputs sourced domestically to be lower 
for foreign firms in all countries. This is consistent with most of the empirical literature 
on linkages, where the usual approach has been to consider the share of inputs bought 
domestically.
 This generally leads to the finding that the share of local to total inputs is 
lower for MNCs, such as the findings of Forsyth (1972) for Scotland and Cohen (1973) 
and Biersteker (1978) in Nigeria. The case of Ireland has received particular attention in 
the literature. McAleese and McDonald (1978) and O’Loughlin and O’Farrell (1980) find 
that foreign subsidiaries in Ireland buy fewer local inputs than national firms.
30 Barry and 
Bandley (1997) also find that foreign firms are more likely to import their inputs than 
local firms. More recently, Gorg and Ruane (2000) study the effect of foreign firms in the 
electronic sector in Ireland between 1982 and 1995. Defining backward linkages as the 
share of domestic inputs to total inputs, they find that foreign firms have lower linkages 
than local firms, although multinationals’ linkages with the local economy tend to 
become stronger with time.  
Our results suggest that some of the common notions in the literature about 
MNCs’ linkage effects may be due to using linkage measures that are not properly 
                                                                                                                                                 
differences seemed to be country-specific. The model developed in Section 4 of the paper is silent, 
however, on the implications of these results. 
27 Appendix B explains in detail the derivation of this calculation and the assumptions behind it. 
28 See McAleese and McDonald (1978) and O’Loughlin and O’Farrell (1980), Gorg and Strobl (2002).  
29 See Gorg and Ruane (2000) for a similar treatment when analyzing the Irish case.  
30 In their work, McAleese and McDonald (1978) define backward linkages as the ratio of current 
expenditure in Ireland relative to total current expenditure by firms while O’Loughlin and O’Farrell (1980) 
define it as the percentage of raw materials and components sourced locally.   
  23derived from theory. As discussed before, using our proposed indicator, we find evidence 
that foreign firms have significantly higher linkage coefficient than local firms in 
Venezuela, Chile and Brazil.
31 We further explored why our results differ from those of 
the current empirical literature by measuring the intensity coefficient, a concept 
introduced in the previous section and calculated as the ratio of total inputs used to the 
number of employees hired (note that linkage coefficient = source coefficient x intensity 
coefficient). We then estimated a similar equation as (5) but with  ijt Intensity Coefficient  
as the dependent variable. The main results are reported in Table 4c. For all countries, we 
found significantly higher intensity coefficients for foreign firms. These results suggest 
that although domestic firms do source a larger percentage of their inputs domestically, 
they also buy fewer inputs in relation to the number of workers they hire. As a result, 
domestic firms do not necessarily generate stronger linkages than foreign firms.   
  It is interesting here to comment on the result that Mexico is the only country in 
which the linkage coefficient of MNCs is not significantly higher than for domestic firms. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that most of Mexico’s MNCs have their 
headquarters in the United States, making it attractive for them to import most of their 
inputs from there (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996). Thus, one would expect the MNCs in Mexico 
to have a much lower share coefficient than domestic firms, and indeed this is what we 
find. As can be seen in Table 2b, the average share coefficient for MNCs and domestic 
firms in Mexico is 54% and 84%, respectively, whereas the corresponding numbers are 
68% and 93%, 79% and 86%, and 87% and 92% for Brazil, Venezuela and Chile, 
respectively. We get the same results when controlling for sectors, as shown in Table 4b. 
 
                                                 
31 As suggested by one of the referees, we explored whether exporting firms have a higher linkage 
coefficient than those firms whose production is aimed at the domestic market. In a regression, Linkage 
Coefficientijt = β0 + β1D_Expitjt + µj  + µt + εijt,. where D_Expitjt is a dummy variable taking the value of 
one if firm i in sector j at time t is exporting; we found that indeed this is the case. In our sample, the 
number of observations geared to the external market ranges from 30% in Mexico to 15% in Chile. The 
results are significant for Chile and Venezuela. Moreover, the share of inputs sourced domestically for 
exporting firms is lower than that for firms oriented to the domestic market. This last result is significant 
for all countries. Our evidence suggests that these results are also driven by the higher intensity coefficients 
of exporting firms relative to those geared to the domestic market. In contrast with the results on MNCs 
that we report in the text, it is not entirely clear how to interpret these results regarding exporting firms. 
This remains an issue for future research. 
  24New Foreign Firms and Time Effects 
Firms might need time to get to know the domestic market and establish 
relationships with the local economy. This means that the linkage effect may be different 
for well-established firms versus those just entering the market. To explore this, we 
regressed the linkage coefficient on the foreign dummy, time and sector dummies, and an 
interaction term meant to capture the effect of new foreign firms. Formally, we estimate 
the following relation: 
(6)  01 2 ijt ijt ijt ijt j t ijt LinkageCoefficient Foreign Foreign NewFirms β ββ µ µ =+ + × +++ ε
                                                
 
where   is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms with less 
than three years of age. Since the hypothesis under study is relevant only on foreign 
firms, we interact this variable with the foreign dummy. As shown in Table 5a, new 
foreign firms tend to have a lower linkage coefficient. However, this result is significant 
only for Venezuela.
ijt NewFirms
32 Because our data sets for Brazil and Chile did not include age 
information, we were not able to perform this exercise for those countries.  
It is reasonable to think that this result arises because the share coefficient for new 
MNCs is lower than for older MNCs, as it takes time for new foreign firms to find 
reliable local suppliers. Support for this hypothesis is not robust. As seen in Table 5b, 
running a regression similar to (6) but with the share coefficient as the dependent variable 
yields a negative and significant coefficient (for the interacted variable) in Mexico, but 
the results for Venezuela were not significant. 
 
32 In this case, the coefficient on  ijt ijt Foreign New firms × indicates that the linkage coefficient for these 
firms is lower than that of well-established foreign firms. In order to obtain the total estimated linkage 
coefficient for new foreign firms, one should add to this coefficient the estimated coefficient for foreign 
firms, the corresponding sector and year dummies and the constant. For both Mexico and Venezuela, the 
results imply a positive total linkage coefficient for new foreign firms. For Mexico the estimated coefficient 
for the constant was 81.39 (1.69) and all year dummies had significant positive values higher than 35.07. 
For Venezuela, the estimated coefficient for the constant was 1174.3 (3.57) and all year dummies had 
significant positive values higher than 3987.4. Note however, that we may be using a linear approximation 
to estimate a non-linear relation of age on the linkage coefficient.  
  25  In order to explore this further, we analyzed how the share of inputs bought 
domestically by foreign firms was likely to evolve throughout time. For that, we estimate 
the following relation for foreign firms: 
(7)  01 ijt ij ijt ShareCoefficient t δ δµ ε = +++ 
where  t stands for time (year) and  ij µ  corresponds to a firm-specific effect. We 
conjecture that once we control for firm characteristics, we should observe foreign firms 
buying an increasingly higher percentage of inputs domestically. That is, we should 
observe a positive coefficient on the time trend variable.  
In effect, we find a positive coefficient for all countries in our sample. However, 
only in the case of Mexico do we find strong evidence that as time progresses, foreign 
firms increase the share of inputs sourced domestically. For the other countries, the 
relation, although positive, is not significant. Likewise, the work by Gorg and Ruane 
(2000) in Ireland finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
extent of linkages and a proxy for firm maturity, as indicated by the date at which the 
firm entered the survey. Their results, consistent with our findings, suggest that as firms 
get accustomed to local markets, they source more inputs locally.  
 
Robustness: Linkages measure 
As explained in Section 4, one potential problem with the measurement of the 
linkage coefficient we have used above has to do with differences in the type of workers 
hired by multinationals and domestic firms. Indeed, the empirical literature finds robust 
evidence that multinationals pay higher wages per employee than domestic firms, and we 
strongly confirm this in our data: in all cases, running a regression of the wage (total 
wages paid over total employees) on a foreign dummy results in a positive and significant 
coefficient, as seen in Table 7.
33 Of course, one likely explanation for such higher wages 
                                                 
33 We estimate an equation similar to (5) but with ijt AverageWage as the dependent variable, where Average 
Wageijt corresponds to total wages per employee in firm i in sector j at time t and the rest is as in the 
previous equations. 
  26has to do with the payment of efficiency wages by multinationals. But it is also likely that 
part of the reason is that multinationals hire more skilled workers.  
Unfortunately, we only have data on the type of workers hired for Venezuela and 
Mexico. For these countries, we confirm the above conjecture: the share of workers that 
are skilled is higher for multinationals than for domestic firms.
34 
 Could it be that the 
results presented above change once we take this into account? Following the discussion 
in the previous section, we calculated the linkage coefficient as the ratio of domestic 
inputs to qualified employees and revisited our estimations with this new measure. The 
main results are reported in table 8a. After controlling for time and sector dummies, we 
still cannot reject the claim that foreign and local firms have similar effects in terms of 
linkages. How do the results compare to those previously obtained using total inputs to 
total workers as defined in equation (1)? In the case of Mexico, for both indicators we 
find that foreign firms have a higher linkage potential than domestic firms. In neither 
case, however, are the results significant at conventional significance levels. For 
Venezuela, however, our results remain positive. But in contrast to the results previously 
obtained, the results are not significant at 10%.   
Table 8b presents the results of running our alternative intensity measure defined 
as the ratio of domestic inputs to qualified employees on the foreign dummy and time and 
sector dummies. For both Mexico and Venezuela, the intensity coefficient remains 
significantly higher for foreign firms, as seen in Table 8b. In this case, in relation to 
previous findings reported in Table 4b, the results remain robust only for Mexico.  
 
Summary 
Consistent with previous findings in the literature, we find that foreign firms in 
Mexico, Chile, Venezuela and Brazil source a lower percentage of their inputs 
domestically when compared to local firms. However, when we use our proposed 
measure of a firm’s (backward) linkage potential, we do not find evidence that MNCs 
have a lower linkage potential. In fact, when we use domestic inputs to total workers as 
                                                 
34 Formally, we estimated an equation similar to (5) but with , whereSh  
corresponds to the ratio of non production workers to total workers in firm i in sector j at time t and the rest 
is as in the previous equations. 
ijt Share Skilled ijt are Skilled
  27the linkage coefficient, we find that multinational’s linkage potential in Brazil, Chile 
and Venezuela is higher than for domestic firms. For Mexico, the coefficient, although 
positive, is not significant.  Using domestic inputs to skilled-workers, however, allows 
us to conclude that foreign and local firms have similar linkage potential in Mexico and 
Venezuela.    
An important caveat of our analysis is that for linkages to be meaningful it must 
be that inputs are non-tradable (or, more generally, have high costs associated with 
importing them, relative to domestic procurement) and produced with increasing returns 
to scale. Unfortunately data limitations do not allow us to control for non-tradability and 
the degree of increasing returns. The approach we follow so far can be interpreted as 
establishing upper bounds on the linkages that can be generated by different firms.  A 
more rigorous analysis of this question requires considering only the purchases of non-
tradable inputs and produced with increasing returns to scale. 
  
5.4– The Case of Costa Rica 
Although Costa Rica does not have good plant-level data, the country collects 
detailed information on all firms under the Export Processing Zone (EPZ) regime.
35 One 
advantage of this data set is that it contains detailed information on the inputs used by 
each firm. This allows us to explore an issue mentioned above, namely the possibility that 
the tradability of inputs may vary across foreign and domestic firms. We briefly report on 
the findings although we stress that any generalization should keep in mind the limited 
nature of our data.  
One robust finding, even in this small sample, is that domestic firms source a 
higher percentage of inputs locally than foreign firms. Moreover, consistent with 
previous results, we do not find evidence that foreign firms have a different linkage 
potential than domestic firms, although this could be due to the small size of our sample.   
                                                 
35 In particular, we have firm data by nationality and sector from the EPZ regime for 1995 and 2000.  We 
have an unbalanced panel with only 118 observations; 57 for 1995 and 61 for 2000; 70% of the firms are 
foreign ones. In this case, firms where either foreign or local.   
  28As mentioned, the data set does allow us to investigate the tradability of the inputs 
used by different firms. For each input, we construct a tradability index as world trade 









We then calculated the average tradability of inputs bought domestically by each firm 













where ( , ) x li denotes spending by firm   in input  .  i l
We used data from UNIDO’s Industrial Demand-Supply Balance Database (2002) 
to construct the tradability index and then ran a regression of  i InputTradability  on a 
foreign dummy with year and sector dummies and verified that multinationals are using 
domestic inputs that are more tradable.
36 This suggests caution in interpreting the above 
results since – as mentioned in the previous section – higher tradability implies less room 
for meaningful linkages. 
Of course, our results are derived form a very particular case.  Any conclusion or 
generalization must keep in mind that we have a small sample of firms located in the EPZ 
regime, which might not necessarily reflect the characteristics of firms in the country. 
However, this case does suggest further research should explore the role of the tradability 
of inputs, as they might be an important determinant when analyzing the linkage potential 
of foreign firms. Unfortunately, the small sample size of our data prevents us from 
pursuing this further. 
 
                                                 
36 The sectors into which we classified firms are maquila, high tech and others according to the EPZ’s 
internal classification system. The estimated coefficient for the foreign dummy is 14.4, with standard 
error 8.23 (t = 1.75). Note that for our small sample size, the estimates are significant at 10%. 
  296 – Discussion: linkages versus the empirical literature on MNCs and externalities 
 The previous section shows that MNCs have a higher linkage coefficient than 
domestic firms in Brazil, Venezuela and Chile (at least when using the linkage coefficient 
with the total number of employees rather than the number of skilled employees in the 
denominator). According to the model presented in Section 4, this should lead to a 
positive backward linkage effect. However, in contrast to what has sometimes been 
implied in the empirical literature on FDI externalities, a positive backward linkage effect 
does not necessarily imply a positive externality from MNCs to suppliers. In fact, such a 
positive linkage effect should be leading to a positive externality from MNCs to other 
firms in the same industry (i.e., a positive horizontal externality). There is thus a puzzle, 
in that the empirical literature finds exactly the opposite: a negative or zero horizontal 
externality and a positive vertical externality. This section discusses this apparent 
contradiction between the implication of our findings and the general conclusions of the 
recent empirical literature on FDI externalities. 
Could positive backward linkages lead to higher productivity for suppliers? In the 
model presented in Section 4, the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier specification implies that all that 
happens when demand for intermediate goods increases is that new suppliers enter the 
market and variety expands, conferring advantages of specialization on downstream 
producers. Suppliers would not be able to expand production, so they would not benefit 
from economies of scale. Generalizing beyond the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier specification, if 
the elasticity of substitution is not constant or if there is an endogenous mark-up (Eckel, 
2003), it is possible that as demand for inputs increases, then both input variety and scale 
of production for suppliers increase, allowing them to reap productivity gains as they go 
down their average cost curve. These productivity gains, however, would not show up as 
increases in total factor productivity in most recent empirical studies, since they allow for 
the existence of increasing returns to scale. Thus, the falling average cost caused by a 
higher scale of production would be captured as gains from economies of scale rather 
than showing up in the residual. 
This reasoning leads us to look for an alternative interpretation of the recent 
empirical finding of a positive externality from MNCs to suppliers. Rather than being 
  30evidence for backward linkages, this could point to the existence of positive knowledge 
spillovers, which would clearly lead to higher TFP among suppliers. Although there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence for such knowledge spillovers (Lateef, 1997; Cynh, 1999) 
interviews we conducted with suppliers and MNCs in Costa Rica revealed few cases 
where it was clear that there had been a positive technology transfer from the MNC to 
suppliers.
37 According to one of the MNCs we interviewed, this is because MNCs often 
do not have technical knowledge about the production process of the inputs they use. The 
cases where they do have such knowledge are usually related to sophisticated inputs that 
are physically integrated in the good being produced by the MNC; in these cases, 
however, it is unlikely that local firms will be able to supply these inputs, which are 
usually obtained by the MNCs from specialized international suppliers. 
Instead of examples of knowledge spillovers, the interviews we conducted 
revealed many cases where suppliers had improved their technologies because of the 
pressures exerted on them by MNCs.
38 That is, instead of stories of MNCs helping 
suppliers to improve their productivity through the transfer of technology, what we found 
were stories of how local firms had decided to upgrade the quality of their production 
process in order to become MNC suppliers. This suggests a different kind of linkage than 
the one we modeled in Section 4. Imagine that suppliers can choose to become high-
quality suppliers, but that this entails some investment. They will make this investment 
only if the demand for high-quality inputs is sufficiently large. Defining the quality-
linkage coefficient as the usage of high-quality inputs per employee, a modification of 
our model in Section 4 would show that if MNCs have a higher quality-linkage 
coefficient than domestic firms, then a stronger MNC presence would lead to a positive 
quality-linkage effect. Such an effect would imply an increase in the variety of high-
quality inputs produced locally and this would lead to an increase in productivity of 
domestic firms in downstream sectors.  More interestingly, it is likely that the quality 
                                                 
37 Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell (1984) reports of considerable knowledge transfer from foreign firms to 
Korean firms: visits to foreign plants by local staff and by foreign buyers to their plants; provision of blue 
prints an specifications, feedback on designs, quality and technical performance of their products.  For 
example, Daewood Electronics (DE) entered an original equipment manufacturing arrangement with 
Japan’s NEC in 1981.  NEC enhanced DE’s capability by providing technological help, see Cyhn (1999).  
38 This is consistent with the findings in the literature on industry upgrading in manufacturing value chains 
(see Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002).  
  31upgrading by suppliers would be captured as an increase in their measured TFP, 
providing an explanation for the observed positive productivity externality from MNCs to 
suppliers. 
The question that remains is why we do not observe a positive externality from 
MNCs to other firms in the same industry.
39 This is a problem not only for the two types 
of linkage effects we have described (one affecting the variety of inputs and the other 
affecting their quality), but also for any other type of positive externality from MNCs to 
suppliers. For instance, if MNCs generate knowledge spillovers to suppliers, one would 
expect this to lead to improvements in the quality of the inputs they produce, and this in 
turn to show up as increases in TFP for downstream firms.
40 In other words, 
independently of the interpretations we suggest in this paper, the joint finding in the 
recent empirical literature of positive vertical externalities and negative horizontal 
externalities poses a puzzle. 
The natural answer to this puzzle is that there must be some negative horizontal 
externality that more than compensates the positive effect that MNCs would have on 
other firms in the same industry through the increases in the variety and quality of 
domestic inputs they help to bring about. Such a negative horizontal productivity 
externality could be the result of a competition effect caused by the entry of MNCs, as 
argued by Aitken and Harrison (1999). If the entry of MNCs shrinks the market for 
domestic firms, this would most likely show up as a reduction in measured TFP because 
of the inability of the econometrician to adjust the measured capital stock for the 
reduction in its usage. Another mechanism through which negative horizontal 
productivity externalities could materialize is that MNCs could steal away the best 
                                                 
39 Note that, as stated in footnote 22, the model we presented implies that the externality benefits domestic 
firms in all sectors, not just in the sector of the multinational. To be more closely aligned with the empirical 
literature, we would have to adopt a different assumption, where intermediate goods are sector specific, so 
that only firms in the multinationals sector benefit from the backward linkages created. However, with our 
interpretation, where intermediate goods are not sector specific, there is no reason why – controlling for 
productivity growth in the whole manufacturing sector – productivity should increase in domestic firms in 
sector j when multinational presence in that sector increases. Thus, our interpretation may be more 
consistent with the results arising from the recent empirical literature.  
40 The case could be made that the knowledge spillover from MNCs to supplier leads to a decrease in input 
prices, which benefits downstream producers, but is captured as increases in materials usage, and hence 
does not show up as TFP growth. Still, one would expect an important part of spillovers to be 
improvements in quality rather than price reductions. Such quality improvements on the part of suppliers 
would most likely imply increases in measured TFP of downstream firms. 
  32workers from domestic firms. The problem here is that there is no formal theory showing 
how this may take place.
41 
 
7 - Conclusion 
In recent years there has been a surge of empirical studies exploring the existence 
of productivity externalities from multinationals to other firms in their host countries. 
This research suggests that firms producing similar goods as multinationals are less likely 
to benefit from these externalities than firms in upstream industries. In fact, one of the 
most surprising conclusions to emerge from this literature is that multinationals may 
generate negative horizontal externalities. This is all the more surprising because the 
existence of positive externalities benefiting upstream industries should somehow have a 
ripple effect and benefit local firms using the same inputs as multinationals. 
In this paper, we have focused on backward linkages as one particular mechanism 
through which externalities from multinationals may materialize. We have shown that by 
using the local sourcing coefficient as a measure of a firm’s linkage potential, the current 
literature may be incorrectly implying that multinationals are likely to have a negative 
backward linkage effect. Using our alternative indicator of a firm’s linkage potential, 
which takes into account the fact that multinationals are likely to use more inputs per unit 
of labor than domestic firms, we find that the opposite is true: multinationals are likely to 
have a positive linkage effect. 
As we have stressed in the paper, however, there are several reasons why this 
result has to be interpreted with caution. First, taking into account differences in the skill 
mix of workers hired by MNCs and domestic firms leads to weaker results, where all we 
can say is that there is no evidence that multinationals linkage effect is negative. Second, 
very preliminary results using data from the Export Processing Zone system in Costa 
Rica suggests that the inputs bought locally by MNCs are more tradable than those 
bought by domestic firms. This would imply that the benefits of the linkages generated 
by MNCs are weaker than for domestic firms. Finally, data constraints have prevented us 
                                                 
41 Hanson (2001) shows how competition for skilled workers may negatively affect domestic firms, but he 
does not show how this would affect their measured productivity. 
  33from exploring the role of other key assumptions of the model (e.g., increasing returns 
and the elasticity of substitution) on the difference between the implied linkage 
coefficient of MNCs and local firms. Clearly, much more research is required into these 
and other matters to clarify the impact of MNCs on host countries through linkages. 
Even taking our results as convincing at this stage, it is not clear that incentives to 
MNCs are warranted. Perhaps a more sensible policy is to eliminate the barriers that 
prevent local firms from establishing adequate linkages. This includes improving local 
firms’ access to inputs, technology, and financing, and streamlining the procedures 
associated with selling inputs to firms in Export Processing Zones. 
A final comment relates to the observation that a strict interpretation of our model 
leads to the conclusion that multinationals’ positive linkage effect should be reflected in a 
positive horizontal externality rather than the commonly found externality from 
multinationals to suppliers. This stands in direct contradiction with the results of the 
recent empirical literature. We argued that a different interpretation of the model, where 
backward linkages lead to quality improvements rather than variety expansion in 
upstream industries, should make the model consistent with the finding of positive 
vertical externalities. But the implication of a positive horizontal externality remains a 
puzzle for both interpretations of the model, as well as for theories where vertical 
externalities occur through knowledge spillovers.  
There are two ways to think about this puzzle. One is that the empirical finding of 
a negative productivity externality from multinationals to firms in the same industry may 
be due to problems with the measurement of productivity or with the econometrics for 
dealing with the endogeneity of the presence of multinationals. Another way to think 
about the puzzle is that there may be some other source of negative productivity 
externality that compensates any positive ripple effect coming from the positive vertical 
externalities associated with multinationals. Exploring these two possibilities further is an 
important topic for future research. 
 
  34Appendix A 
In this appendix we derive a sufficient condition for the LHS of equation (4) to be 
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The first component is decreasing by our assumption that  ( ) vj θ <  for all j. As to the 
second term, recall that  ( ) j n σ  is the ratio of the price of good j to the minimum unit cost 
of multinationals. Using the fact that in equilibrium domestic firms producing good j 
make zero profits, it is easy to show that: 
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 for all j, then the LHS of equation (4) is decreasing in n. Noting 
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  In this appendix we show the procedure we follow to derive the quantitative 
significance of the regression results in section 5.3. To do so, we want to derive an 
expression for  ln / ln s im w ∂∂ L , where s is some sector possibly different from i. Since we 
are interested only in gauging the order of magnitude of this term, we will assume that 
() j β β =
jm j L
 (and hence  ) for all j and also that we start out in a situation where  ( ) vj= v
L η =  for all j. Moreover, we will ignore the second order element associated with 
the impact of changing variety on the intensity coefficient of multinationals. This entails 
disregarding the derivative of  ( ) j n σ  with respect to n. Thus, we can substitute  ( ) j λ  for 
1/ ( () j
) (
j ) j vj 
β γσ

 in expression (4). Using 
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following equation that determines equilibrium n: 
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Using our assumption that  jm j LL η =  for all j and manipulating the resulting expression 
we obtain: 
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To proceed, empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution among 
intermediate goods revolve around 4 (see Feenstra, 1994), which implies that 
11 / 4 3 / 4 α =− = . In turn, this implies that  1 3
α
α θ − = = .  
We can obtain η directly from the data.  For ν , we experimented with two 





= =1. Alternatively, for each 
domestic firm, we have data on the wages paid and also on the linkage coefficient for 
domestic firms (the total value of inputs bought domestically per unit of labor hired), 
which corresponds to  i wv α . In order to obtain an average parameter value for ν , we 
estimated the following relation  01 ijt LinkageCoefficient AverageWages ijt A A ijt ε = ++ . We 
use the resulting estimate for   to obtain  1 A ν  from ν = 1 A /α . Given α =0.75, for the case 
of Venezuela, for example, the estimated value of ν  was 2.3, which in turn implies 
β =0.3. 
  37η corresponds to the share of workers hired by multinationals; and  i ϖ  the share 
of workers in sector i.  Employment data was taken from the corresponding Annual 
Industry Survey.  
() i lw iw i v α λα =− , the difference between the total value of inputs bought 
domestically per unit of labor hired by multinationals and domestic firms, respectively, 
corresponds to the estimated coefficient for the foreign dummy in equation (5). 
For the value of inputs bought domestically per unit of labor hired by the domestic 
firm in sector i,  i wv α , we used the corresponding estimated value of the sector dummies 
plus the effect for the base year (the first year in each of the data sets) in (5). Hence, the 
estimated elasticities correspond the first year in each data set.  We multiplied the value 
i wv α  by the share of workers in each sector i,  i ϖ . We finally added the terms across all 
sectors and added  l η  to obtaining the term in the denominator,  jj j wv l α ϖη + ∑ . 
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. In the text, we report average results for ν =1. In the case of 








 in 1995 for each sector of the 
9 manufacturing sectors according to 2 digit-ISIC2 classification correspond to 0.60%, 
0.27%, 0.05%, 0.15%, 0.47%, 0.18%, 0.26%, 0.43%, and 0.03%.  
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  46Table 1: Overview of Evidence on Spillovers from Foreign to Local Firms  
in Developing Countries 
 




Mexico, 1970  Higher foreign shares in an industry in 1970 led 
to higher rates of productivity growth in locally 
owned firms over the next five years. 
Kokko, Zejan 
and Tansini  
(2001) 
Uruguay, 1988  Positive spillovers from FDI to a sub-sample of 
locally-owned manufacturing plants with 
moderate technology gaps vis-a-vis foreign 
firms.  
Sjoholm (1999)  Indonesia, 
1980-1991 
 Positive effects from FDI to locally owned 
establishments. 
Cross-sectional do not control 
for time invariant differences in 
productivity across sectors, 
which might be correlated but 
not caused by foreign presence. 




FDI flows ind. 
countries to 69 
LDC, 1970-
1979; 1980-1989 
FDI contributes to growth only when the host 
country has a minimum threshold stock of 
human capital. 
Estimation does not fully control 
for simultaneity bias, country-
specific effects and the use of 




Harrison  (1994) 
Morocco,   
1985-1989 
Reject the hypothesis that foreign presence 






Small net impact of foreign investment. 
Positive effect of foreign equity participation on 
plant productivity robust only for small firms. 
Negative effect foreign investment on 





Joint ventures and foreign direct investment 
have a negative spillover effect on firms that do 
not have foreign partnerships. 
Fixed-effect estimation do not 
address the simultaneity bias that 
results from the dependence of 
factor inputs on productivity 
levels and exit decisions. 





No evidence horizontal spillovers, some 





Strong evidence for backward spillovers. 
López-Córdova 
(2003) 
Mexico,     
1993-2000 
Foreign capital improves (TFP); positive inter-
industry spillovers form FDI prevail over a 
negative intra-industry effect 
In differentiated product 
industries, sales revenues and 
input expenditures are not good 
proxies for physical outputs and 
inputs, respectively; leading to 







1960-1995,       
5 year-periods 
 
Exogenous component of FDI does not exert a 
robust, positive influence on economic growth.  
 
  47Table 2a:  Average Linkage Coefficient by Year and Firm Ownership 
                  Mean 
Brazil  1997 1998 1999 2000              
Foreign  72541 60578 41043 44405             55320 
Local   38427 43956 29012 25821             34847 
                   
Venezuela  1995 1996 1997 1998  1999            
Foreign  3920  5566  10303  18805  14558           9818 
Local   3829  5833  9085  12262  10411           7900 
                     
Mexico  1993 1994 1995 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000         
Foreign  101 117 154 222  236  257  288  402           217 
Local   98  113  202  264  322 359 336 351            247 
                     
Chile  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999   
Foreign  3569  12926  14908  16864  19488 22190 23892 28700 20454 20833 22542 25441 27249  15803 
Local   2723  3117  3622  4219  5387 5975 6528 7012 8766 9472  10564  11577  15343  7263 
Notes: The average linkage coefficient was calculated as the average value of domestic inputs to total workers per year 
for foreign and domestic firms respectively. Data in local currency, for Venezuela in thousands. Data are from the 




Table 2b:  Average Share of Domestic Inputs to Total Inputs  
by Year and Firm Ownership 
Notes: The average share was calculated as the average value of domestic inputs to total inputs per year for foreign and 
domestic firms respectively.  See notes to Table 1a for data sources. 
                Mean 
Brazil  1997 1998 1999 2000              
Foreign  0.705 0.685 0.671 0.662             0.682 
Local   0.933 0.934 0.934 0.933             0.933 
                 
Venezuela  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999            
Foreign   0.759  0.830  0.783  0.698  0.824           0.792 
Local   0.851  0.880  0.861  0.822  0.870           0.861 
                 
Mexico  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000         
Foreign   0.560 0.551 0.534 0.533 0.520 0.530 0.533 0.522            0.536 
Local   0.854 0.847 0.855 0.853 0.835 0.842 0.835 0.820            0.844 
                 
Chile  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999   
Foreign   0.915 0.882 0.896 0.893 0.894 0.883 0.874 0.874 0.756 0.724 0.702 0.759 0.767  0.874 
Local   0.914 0.927 0.933 0.935 0.933 0.923 0.920 0.912 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.923 0.936  0.923 
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Table 2c:  Average Intensity Coefficient by Year and Firm Ownership 
Notes: The average intensity coefficient was calculated as the average value of total inputs to total workers per year for 
foreign and domestic firms respectively.  Data in local currency, for Venezuela in thousands. See notes to Table 1a for 
data sources. 
                    Mean 
Brazil  1997 1998 1999  2000              
Foreign  100049 88433 65233 70070             81684 
Local   43838 49549 33165  29853             39700 
                    
Venezuela  1995 1996 1997  1998  1999           
Foreign   6146  8700  15779  28720  20164           14597 
Local   4704  7265  11674  16445  13368           10138 
                     
Mexico  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000         
Foreign   174  210  319  464  532  591  652  811        457 
Local   120  138  246  324  405  444  417  445        305 
                     
Chile  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999   
Foreign   4117  14426  16435  19011  22154 25410 27318 32819 27809 29035 33130 33590 38820  18731 
Local   3202  3575  4109  4752  6112  6913  7643  8348  10097 10818 11998 13117 16984  8299 
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Table 3:  Linkage effects  - Foreign Ownership  
Dependent variable— Linkage coefficient, firm i  
(Value of inputs bought domestically to total workers) 
    Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








       
Observations  38926 65812 47065 13724 
R












Notes: All regressions include annual time dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's correction of 
heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. Foreign is a dummy 







Table 4a:  Linkage effect –  Foreign Ownership Controlling for Sectors  
Dependent variable— Linkage coefficient, firm i  
(Value of inputs bought domestically to total workers) 
    Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








        
Observations 38926  65812  47065  13724 
R












Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign ownership. For Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, industry dummies correspond 
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Table 4b: Share – Foreign Ownership Controlling for Sectors 
Dependent variable— Share of inputs sourced domestically, firm i 
 
  Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








        
Observations 38926  65720  44575  13555 
 
Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated using a Tobit model.  t-
statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. See notes to tables 2a and 3a for 






Table 4c:  Intensity – Foreign Ownership Controlling for Sectors 
Dependent variable —  Ratio of total inputs to workers, firm i 
  Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








        
Observations  38926 65812 46692 13724 
R
2  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
 
Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. See 
notes to tables 2a and 3a for definitions of the other variables. 
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Table 5a: Linkage Effects -  Age New Foreign Firms - Sectors 
Dependent variable— Linkage coefficient, firm i   
(Value of inputs bought domestically to total workers) 
 
  Mexico Venezuela 









    
Observations 47065  13724 
R















Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. New 





Table 5b: Share  - Tobit Regression -  Age New Foreign Firms - Sectors 
Dependent variable— Share of inputs sourced domestically, firm i 
 
  Mexico Venezuela 




New Firms × Foreign 
-0.085 
(-2.94)*** 
0.159      
(0.46) 
    













Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated using a Tobit model.  t-
statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. New Firms is a dummy variable for 












  52 
 
Table 6: Share  – Time Trend Foreign Firms 
Dependent variable— Share of inputs sourced domestically, foreign firm i 
 
  Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








      
Observations  3152 6223 4408 1508 










Notes:  All regressions include firm specific effects using a random effect Tobit model. z-statistics are in parentheses 
denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. Regressions include only foreign firms. See notes to tables 2a and 3a 





Table 7:  Average Wages 
Dependent variable —  Total wages to number of workers, firm i 
  Brazil Chile  Mexico  Venezuela 








      
Observations  38926 65812 47108 13724 
R
2 0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2 
 
Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. 
Average wages calculated as total wages to total number of workers. Data in local currency, for Venezuela in 
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Table 8a:  Linkage effect –  per Qualified Worker 
Dependent variable— Linkage coefficient, firm I 
(Value of inputs bought domestically to qualified workers) 
    Mexico Venezuela 




    
Observations 46386  10439 
R












Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. 
Linkage coefficient calculated as inputs bought domestically to total number of qualified (or non production) workers. 




Table 8b:  Intensity  –   per Qualified Worker 
Dependent variable —  Ratio of total inputs to number of qualified worker, firm i 
    Mexico Venezuela 




    
Observations 46018  10439 
R












Notes:  All regressions include annual time dummies and industry dummies and are estimated by OLS with White's 
correction of heteroskedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses denoting *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% significance. 
Intensity coefficient calculated as total inputs to total number of qualified workers. Data in local currency. 
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